Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=263812
 
 

References (34)



 
 

Citations (7)



 


 



Endogenous Vertical Restraints In International Trade


Horst Raff


Christian-Albrechts-Universitaet zu Kiel; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute); Kiel Institute for the World Economy

Nicolas Schmitt


Simon Fraser University; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

April 2000

CESifo Working Paper Series No. 284

Abstract:     
this paper examines interbrand competition between a domestic and a foreign manufacturer who market their products through intermediaries. the contracts manufacturers offer these intermediaries are endogenous. in equilibrium contracts may specify exclusive territories (et), depending on the degree of substitutability between products and the level and degree of transparency of trade barriers. trade liberalization, through lower or more transparent barriers, may lead manufacturers to use et, thereby substituting private anti-competitive arrangements for government-imposed barriers. this substitution may decrease competition and welfare, and thus create a role for competition policy in a freer trade environment.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 39

JEL Classification: F13, L42

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Date posted: March 22, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Raff, Horst and Schmitt, Nicolas, Endogenous Vertical Restraints In International Trade (April 2000). CESifo Working Paper Series No. 284. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=263812

Contact Information

Horst Raff (Contact Author)
Christian-Albrechts-Universitaet zu Kiel ( email )
Institut fur Volkswirtschaftslehre
Wilhelm-Seelig-Platz 1
Kiel, 24098
Germany
+49-431-880-1582 (Phone)
+49-431-880-3150 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.wiso.uni-kiel.de/vwlinstitute/Raff/?page=raff
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Kiel Institute for the World Economy ( email )
P.O. Box 4309
Kiel, D-24100
Germany
Nicolas Schmitt
Simon Fraser University ( email )
Department of Economics
8888 University Drive
Burnaby, BC V5A 1S6
Canada
604 291 4582 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.sfu.ca/~schmitt/
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
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References:  34
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