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http://ssrn.com/abstract=265652
 
 

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Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries


Howard A. Shelanski


Georgetown University

Gregory Sidak


Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC), Tilburg University; Criterion Economics, L.L.C.


University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 1, pp. 1-99, Winter 2001

Abstract:     
The landmark Microsoft case raises challenging questions concerning antitrust remedies. In this Article, we propose a framework for assessing the costs and benefits of different remedies, particularly divestiture, in monopolization cases involving network industries. Our approach can assist a court or enforcement agency not only in analyzing the welfare effects of divestiture, but also in choosing more generally among alternative kinds of remedies. The framework would, for example, apply to a court's choice between damages and injunctive remedies or between behavioral injunctions and structural injunctions. After developing our framework, we apply it to the divestiture proposals made by the government and others in the Microsoft case. We argue that those proposals leave open important questions that must be answered before divestiture can be shown to be either the best remedial alternative or to create likely net gains in economic welfare.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 93

JEL Classification: KO, L4, L5, D6, K21, K23, L9

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Date posted: April 19, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Shelanski, Howard A. and Sidak, Gregory, Antitrust Divestiture in Network Industries. University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 68, No. 1, pp. 1-99, Winter 2001. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=265652

Contact Information

Howard A. Shelanski
Georgetown University ( email )
Washington, DC 20057
United States
J. Gregory Sidak (Contact Author)
Tilburg Law & Economics Center (TILEC), Tilburg University ( email )
Tilburg, 5000 LE
Netherlands
Criterion Economics, L.L.C. ( email )
1614 20th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20009
United States
(202) 518-5121 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://www.criterioneconomics.com
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