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Individual Rights and Collective Agents: The Role of Old and New Workplace Institutions in the Regulation of Labor Markets

David Weil
Boston University School of Management; Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government


April 2001


Abstract:     
Implementation of workplace policies-whether through enforcement of laws or administration of programs-raises the question of the interaction between institutions created to carry out laws and the activities of workplace based agents that directly (e.g., unions) or indirectly (e.g., insurance companies) represent the interests of workers. This paper argues that there are two distinctive roles required for agents in the implementation of workplace policies. First, the agent must somehow help solve the public goods problem inherent in workplace regulation. Second, the agent must be able to reduce the marginal cost of exercising rights conferred to workers that are an important feature of most regulatory programs. This article examines these issues in regard to implementing workplace policies in the U.S. and analyzes the comparative effectiveness of different workplace agents-from labor unions to alternative dispute resolution systems-in fulfilling these roles.

Keywords: Workplace policies, labor policy, labor market intermediaries, implementation

JEL Classifications: J58, J68, J71, L51, K31

Working Paper Series

Date posted: April 23, 2001 ; Last revised: October 28, 2008

Suggested Citation

Weil, David, Individual Rights and Collective Agents: The Role of Old and New Workplace Institutions in the Regulation of Labor Markets (April 2001). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=265678 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.265678


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Contact Information

David Weil (Contact Author)
Boston University School of Management ( email )
595 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02215
United States
617-353-4615 (Phone)
617-353-6667 (Fax)
Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government ( email )
79 John F. Kennedy Street
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-8474 (Phone)
617-496-1722 (Fax)
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