Abstract

 
 

References (28)



 
 

Citations (22)



 


 



The Block Pricing Puzzle


Michael J. Barclay


University of Rochester - Simon School (Deceased)

Clifford G. Holderness


Boston College - Department of Finance

Dennis P. Sheehan


Pennsylvania State University

March 2001

Simon School of Business Working Paper No. FR 01-05

Abstract:     
There are two ways to buy a large-percentage block of stock - from another shareholder or directly from the corporation. Because the traded asset is the same, one might expect the pricing of these transactions to be similar. Block trades, however, are priced at an 11% premium to the post-announcement exchange price, while private placements are priced at a 19% discount. This difference reflects what happens after the transactions. Most block-trade purchasers become involved in management, suggesting that their premiums reflect anticipated private benefits. Most private-placement purchasers remain passive, firm value declines, and there are few acquisitions. This suggests that private-placement discounts often reflect compensation to external blockholders for helping to entrench management.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Negotiated block trades, private placements, block pricing, discounts, premiums

JEL Classification: G3

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: April 9, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Barclay, Michael J., Holderness, Clifford G. and Sheehan, Dennis P., The Block Pricing Puzzle (March 2001). Simon School of Business Working Paper No. FR 01-05. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=265712 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.265712

Contact Information

Michael J. Barclay
University of Rochester - Simon School (Deceased)
N/A
Clifford G. Holderness
Boston College - Department of Finance ( email )
Carroll School of Management
140 Commonwealth Avenue
Chestnut Hill, MA 02467-3808
United States
617-552-2768 (Phone)
617-277-8071 (Fax)
Dennis P. Sheehan (Contact Author)
Pennsylvania State University ( email )
Smeal College of Business
University Park, PA 16802
United States
814-863-8512 (Phone)
814-865-3362 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 5,328
Downloads: 1,331
Download Rank: 5,757
References:  28
Citations:  22

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo8 in 0.312 seconds