A Public Choice Theory of Criminal Procedure
Keith N. Hylton
Boston University; Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law
Vikramaditya S. Khanna
University of Michigan Law School
Supreme Court Economic Review, Vol. 15, pp. 61-118, 2007
Boston Univ., Law and Economics Research Paper No. 01-02
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 318
In this paper we provide an economic justification for the pro-defendant bias in American Criminal Procedure that we argue paints a more complete picture of the extent and breadth of these pro-defendant procedures than the most commonly forwarded justifications to date. The most commonly forwarded rationale for the pro-defendant bias in American Criminal Procedure is that the costs associated with false convictions (i.e., sanctioning and deterrence costs associated with the erroneous imposition of criminal sanctions) are greater than the costs associated with false acquittals. We argue that on closer inspection this rationale does not justify the extent of our pro-defendant criminal procedures. We offer another justification for these protections: to constrain the costs associated with abuses of prosecutorial or governmental authority. In a nutshell, our claim is that these procedural protections make it more costly for self-interested actors, whether individuals or government enforcement agents, to use the criminal process to obtain their own ends. Such protections help to reduce the rent-seeking and deterrence costs associated with abuses of prosecutorial or governmental authority in the criminal sphere. The theory developed here explains several key institutional features of American Criminal Procedure and provides a positive theory of the case law as well. The theory is also corroborated by empirical evidence on corruption from several countries.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 56
JEL Classification: K14, K41Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: April 4, 2001
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