Comparing Assumptions Underlying Regulatory Inspection Strategies: Implications for Oversight Policy

Van Slyke Shanna R, Cullen Francis & Benson Michael (eds.) (2016) The Oxford Handbook of White-Collar Crime. Oxford: Oxford University Press

35 Pages Posted: 19 Sep 2015

See all articles by Peter Mascini

Peter Mascini

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law; Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Faculty of Social Sciences

Date Written: September 14, 2015

Abstract

This chapter first distinguishes four influential policy ideas about regulatory inspection — criminalizing corporate non-compliance, reintegrative shaming, the enforcement pyramid, and risk-based regulation — in terms of assumed compliance motives. Subsequently, the state-centeredness of these four policy ideas is contrasted with the polycentric point of view underlying responsive regulation and regulatory governance. Finally, it is concluded that general perspectives underlie each of the aforementioned policy ideas on regulatory inspection. Regulation is viewed in terms of conflict or harmony or as a social or scientific process, and regulatory power is conceived of as concentrated or dispersed. All regulatory inspection ideas grapple with implementation problems. This means the comparative edge of the various ideas cannot be easily established empirically. Ultimately, it comes down to determining the context in which these different ideas are most effective.

Keywords: compliance motives, enforcement pyramid, regulatory governance, reintegrative shaming, responsive regulation, risk-based regulation.

JEL Classification: K42, L50, I18, K20, K23

Suggested Citation

Mascini, Peter, Comparing Assumptions Underlying Regulatory Inspection Strategies: Implications for Oversight Policy (September 14, 2015). Van Slyke Shanna R, Cullen Francis & Benson Michael (eds.) (2016) The Oxford Handbook of White-Collar Crime. Oxford: Oxford University Press , Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2660183

Peter Mascini (Contact Author)

Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Erasmus School of Law ( email )

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Erasmus University Rotterdam (EUR) - Faculty of Social Sciences ( email )

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HOME PAGE: http://https://www.eur.nl/people/peter-mascini/

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