Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics

Annual Review of Political Science, Forthcoming

39 Pages Posted: 16 Sep 2015 Last revised: 24 Sep 2018

See all articles by Scott Gehlbach

Scott Gehlbach

University of Chicago

Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy

Milan Svolik

Yale University - Department of Political Science

Multiple version iconThere are 2 versions of this paper

Date Written: August 1, 2015

Abstract

The last decade has witnessed growing interest among political scientists and economists in nondemocratic politics. This trend has been reflected in increasingly rigorous game-theoretic modeling of its various aspects: regime persistence and breakdown; ruling-coalition formation and leadership change; protests and repression; formal institutions and elections; censorship and media control. We review this research agenda, focusing on the foundational assumptions and political intuition behind key models. Our survey reveals a field populated by disparate models of particular mechanisms that nonetheless share two major analytical themes: asymmetries of information and commitment problems. We propose that future models move toward a genuinely comparative study of authoritarian institutions.

Keywords: nondemocratic politics, dictatorship, game theory

JEL Classification: D72, P16, C72

Suggested Citation

Gehlbach, Scott and Sonin, Konstantin and Svolik, Milan, Formal Models of Nondemocratic Politics (August 1, 2015). Annual Review of Political Science, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2660482

Scott Gehlbach

University of Chicago ( email )

1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Konstantin Sonin

University of Chicago - Harris School of Public Policy ( email )

1155 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States

Milan Svolik (Contact Author)

Yale University - Department of Political Science ( email )

Box 208269
New Haven, CT 06520-8269
United States

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