Abstract

 
 

Citations (11)



 
 

Footnotes (19)



 


 



Economic Performance and Stabilization Policy in a Monetary Union with Imperfect Labour and Goods Markets


Fabrizio Coricelli


Université Paris I Panthéon-Sorbonne; Paris School of Economics (PSE); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Alex Cukierman


Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics; Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Alberto Dalmazzo


University of Siena - Department of Economics

March 2001

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2745

Abstract:     
This Paper develops a framework for the analysis of the effects of institutions on economic performance in a monetary union in the presence of stabilization policy, unionized labour markets and monopolistically competitive price setting firms. Nominal wages are fixed contractually. In spite of full price flexibility transmission of monetary policy operates via both aggregate demand and aggregate supply channels. The Paper relates average, as well as country-specific economic performance within the monetary union, broken down to country size, number of unions, the degree of product differentiation on product markets, and central bank conservativeness. Economic performance is characterized by unemployment, inflation, real wages and competitiveness. Both average, as well as country-specific, economic performance in the presence of (possibly) heterogeneous shocks and a unified stabilization policy are evaluated.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Central bank conservativeness, monetary union, monopolistic competition, shocks, stabilization, stabilization policy, wage bargaining

JEL Classification: E24, E31, E58

working papers series


Date posted: April 17, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Coricelli, Fabrizio, Cukierman, Alex and Dalmazzo, Alberto, Economic Performance and Stabilization Policy in a Monetary Union with Imperfect Labour and Goods Markets (March 2001). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2745. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=267102

Contact Information

Fabrizio Coricelli (Contact Author)
University of Paris 1 Pantheon-Sorbonne ( email )
17, rue de la Sorbonne
Paris, IL 75005
France
Paris School of Economics (PSE)
48 Boulevard Jourdan
Paris, 75014 75014
France
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Alex Cukierman
Tel Aviv University - Eitan Berglas School of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 39040
Ramat Aviv, Tel Aviv, 69978
Israel
+972 3 540 5360 (Phone)
+972 3 640 9908 (Fax)
Interdisciplinary Center (IDC) Herzliyah ( email )
P.O. Box 167
Herzliya, 46150
Israel
HOME PAGE: http://www.tau.ac.il/~alexcuk/
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Alberto Dalmazzo
University of Siena - Department of Economics ( email )
Piazza S. Francesco, 7
Siena, I-53100
Italy
+39 0577 232 697 (Phone)
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 800
Downloads: 19
Citations:  11
Footnotes:  19

© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright
This page was processed by apollo3 in 1.219 seconds