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Deunionization, Technical Change and Inequality

Daron Acemoglu
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Philippe Aghion
Harvard University - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Giovanni Violante
Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)


April 2001

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2764

Abstract:     
Over the last 25 years, the US and the UK have experienced sharp increases in wage inequality and rapid deunionization. We argue that these two phenomena are related, and that skill-biased technical change has been an important factor in deunionization as well as in the rise in inequality. Skill-biased technical change causes deunionization because it increases the outside option of skilled workers, undermining the coalition among skilled and unskilled worker in support of unions. Our approach implies that although deunionization is not the underlying cause of the increase in inequality, it amplifies the direct effect of skill-biased technical change by removing the wage compression imposed by unions. We also show that deunionization may happen inefficiently.

Keywords: Deunionization, efficiency-enhancing unions, rent-seeking unions, skill-biased technical change, wage inequality

JEL Classifications: J30, J50, O30

Working Paper Series

Date posted: April 18, 2001 ; Last revised: April 26, 2001

Suggested Citation

Acemoglu, Daron, Aghion, Philippe and Violante, Giovanni, Deunionization, Technical Change and Inequality (April 2001). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2764. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=267264


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Contact Information

Daron Acemoglu (Contact Author)
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Department of Economics ( email )
50 Memorial Drive
Room E52-380b
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-1927 (Phone)
617-253-1330 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Philippe Aghion
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-6675 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Giovanni Violante
Leonard N. Stern School of Business - Department of Economics ( email )
269 Mercer Street
New York, NY 10003
United States
212-992-9771 (Phone)
212-995-4186 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
90-98 Goswell Road
London EC1V 7RR United Kingdom
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