Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox
Steven L. Schwarcz
Duke University - School of Law
University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2002, No. 1, 2002
Duke Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 18
Although merely private entities, rating agencies have a profound economic impact on global finance. At the same time, these entities have engaged in potential abuses, such as threatening to assign unrequested ratings in order to force companies to use their services. Nonetheless, rating agencies are largely unregulated in the United States and abroad. I examine whether rating agencies should be regulated and, if so, whether it is feasible for individual nations to regulate multinational entities of this type.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 29Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: May 4, 2001
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