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Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox

Steven L. Schwarcz
Duke University - School of Law



University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2002, No. 1, 2002
Duke Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 18

Abstract:     
Although merely private entities, rating agencies have a profound economic impact on global finance. At the same time, these entities have engaged in potential abuses, such as threatening to assign unrequested ratings in order to force companies to use their services. Nonetheless, rating agencies are largely unregulated in the United States and abroad. I examine whether rating agencies should be regulated and, if so, whether it is feasible for individual nations to regulate multinational entities of this type.

Accepted Paper Series

Date posted: May 04, 2001 ; Last revised: February 10, 2006

Suggested Citation

Schwarcz, Steven L., Private Ordering of Public Markets: The Rating Agency Paradox. University of Illinois Law Review, Vol. 2002, No. 1, 2002; Duke Law School, Public Law Working Paper No. 18. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=267273 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.267273


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Steven L. Schwarcz (Contact Author)
Duke University - School of Law ( email )
Box 90360
Durham, NC 27708
United States
919-613-7060 (Phone)
919-613-7231 (Fax)
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