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Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring

George J. Mailath
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Steven A. Matthews
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics

Tadashi Sekiguchi
Kobe University


March 5, 2001

PIER Working Paper 01-009

Abstract:     
We present three examples of finitely repeated games with public monitoring that have sequential equilibria in private strategies, i.e., strategies that depend on own past actions as well as public signals. Such private sequential equilibria can have features quite unlike those of the more familiar perfect public equilibria: (i) making a public signal less informative can create Pareto superior equilibrium outcomes; (ii) the equilibrium final-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium; and (iii) even if the stage game has a unique correlated (and hence Nash) equilibrium, the first-period action profile need not be a stage game equilibrium.

Keywords: Private strategies, repeated games, public perfect equilibria

JEL Classifications: C72, C73

Working Paper Series

Date posted: May 02, 2001 ; Last revised: May 07, 2001

Suggested Citation

Mailath, George J., Matthews, Steven A. and Sekiguchi, Tadashi, Private Strategies in Finitely Repeated Games with Imperfect Public Monitoring (March 5, 2001). PIER Working Paper 01-009. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=267787 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.267787


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Contact Information

George J. Mailath (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7749 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.ssc.upenn.edu/~gmailath
Steven A. Matthews
University of Pennsylvania - Department of Economics ( email )
3718 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-7749 (Phone)
215-573-2057 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.econ.upenn.edu/~stevenma
Tadashi Sekiguchi
Kobe University ( email )
2-1, Rokkodai-cho, Nada-ku
Kobe, 657-8501 657-8501
Japan
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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