Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=268530
 
 

References (74)



 
 

Citations (487)



 


 



The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century


Raghuram G. Rajan


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; International Monetary Fund (IMF); National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

Luigi Zingales


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

May 2001

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2783

Abstract:     
We show that the development of the financial sector does not change monotonically over time. In particular, we find that by most measures, countries were more financially developed in 1913 than in 1980 and only recently have they surpassed their 1913 levels. This pattern is inconsistent with most recent theories of why cross-country differences in financial development do not track differences in economic development, since these theories are based upon time-invariant factors, such as a country's legal origin. We propose instead an 'interest group' theory of financial development. Incumbents oppose financial development because it breeds competition. The theory predicts that incumbents? opposition will be weaker when an economy allows both cross-border trade and capital flows. This theory can go some way towards accounting for the cross-country differences and the time series variation of financial development.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 79

Keywords: Financial development, history of equity market, political economy

JEL Classification: G30, M20, O16

working papers series


Date posted: May 3, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Rajan, Raghuram G. and Zingales, Luigi, The Great Reversals: The Politics of Financial Development in the 20th Century (May 2001). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2783. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=268530

Contact Information

Raghuram G. Rajan (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-4437 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
International Monetary Fund (IMF) ( email )
700 19th Street NW
Washington, DC 20431
United States
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
773-702-9299 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
Luigi Zingales
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-3196 (Phone)
773-834-2081 (Fax)

Chicago Booth School of Business Logo

National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
University of Chicago - Polsky Center for Entrepreneurship
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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References:  74
Citations:  487

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