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Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries


Richard Schmalensee


Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

David S. Evans


University of Chicago Law School; University College London; Global Economics Group

May 2001

NBER Working Paper No. w8268

Abstract:     
Competition in many important industries centers on investment in intellectual property. Firms engage in dynamic, Schumpeterian competition for the market, through sequential winner-take-all races to produce drastic innovations, rather than through static price/output competition in the market. Sound antitrust economic analysis of such industries requires explicit consideration of dynamic competition. Most leading firms in these dynamically competitive industries have considerable short-run market power, for instance, but ignoring their vulnerability to drastic innovation may yield misleading conclusions. Similarly, conventional tests for predation cannot discriminate between practices that increase or decrease consumer welfare in winner-take-all industries. Finally, innovation in dynamically competitive industries often involves enhancing feature sets; there is no sound economic basis for treating such enhancements as per se illegal ties.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 68

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Date posted: May 5, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Schmalensee, Richard and Evans, David S., Some Economic Aspects of Antitrust Analysis in Dynamically Competitive Industries (May 2001). NBER Working Paper No. w8268. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=268877

Contact Information

Richard Schmalensee
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) - Sloan School of Management ( email )
Room E52-410
Cambridge, MA 02142
United States
617-253-2957 (Phone)
617-258-6617 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
David S. Evans (Contact Author)
University of Chicago Law School ( email )
1111 E. 60th St.
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
University College London ( email )
London WC1E OEG
United Kingdom
Global Economics Group ( email )
1400 S. Dearborn, Suite 400
Chicago, IL 60603
United States
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