Intergenerational Risk Sharing in the Spirit of Arrow, Debreu, and Rawls, with Applications to Social Security Design
Johns Hopkins University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
NBER Working Paper No. w8270
This paper examines the optimal allocation of risk in an overlapping-generations economy. It compares the allocation of risk the economy reaches naturally to the allocation that would be reached if generations behind a Rawlsian 'veil of ignorance' could share risk with one another through complete Arrow-Debreu contingent-claims markets. The paper then examines how the government might implement optimal intergenerational risk sharing with a social security system. One conclusion is that the system must either hold equity claims to capital or negatively index benefits to equity returns.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 42working papers series
Date posted: May 5, 2001
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