Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=268954
 
 

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Givings


Abraham Bell


University of San Diego School of Law; Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law

Gideon Parchomovsky


University of Pennsylvania Law School; Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law

April 1, 2001

Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 320
Yale Law Journal, Vol. 111, p. 547, 2001
Fordham Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12

Abstract:     
Givings - government acts that enhance property value - are omnipresent. Givings and takings are mirror images of one another, and of equal practical and theoretical importance, but the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment has enabled takings to dominate scholarly attention. This Article makes the first step toward rectifying this disparate treatment by laying the foundation for a law of givings.

The Article identifies three prototype givings: physical givings, regulatory givings and derivative givings. The Article shows that givings are a formative force in property, and that a comprehensive takings jurisprudence cannot be devised without an attendant understanding of givings and their relationship to takings.

The Article turns to the task of determining when a giving occurs, and when a "fair charge" - the givings' analogue of "just compensation" - should be assessed on the beneficiaries. By extracting the essential features of takings law, the Article molds the universe of givings into four conceptual clusters. The first cluster is organized around determining when and whether givings can be characterized as reverse takings. The second separates between singled-out givings and majoritarian givings. The third distinguishes between refusable and nonrefusable givings. The fourth differentiates between givings directly linked to particular takings and givings that are not. Finally, the Article offers a three-step model for identifying, assessing, and charging for givings, thereby demonstrating the practical administrability of a law of givings.

The Article argues that charging for givings would reduce interest group politics, enhance the efficiency of government and improve the fairness of the property system.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

JEL Classification: D30, D61, D63, D72, H50, K11, K19

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Date posted: May 9, 2001 ; Last revised: September 21, 2008

Suggested Citation

Bell, Abraham and Parchomovsky, Gideon, Givings (April 1, 2001). Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 320; Yale Law Journal, Vol. 111, p. 547, 2001; Fordham Law & Economics Research Paper No. 12. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=268954 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.268954

Contact Information

Abraham Bell
University of San Diego School of Law ( email )
5998 Alcala Park
San Diego, CA 92110-2492
United States
Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law ( email )
Faculty of Law
Ramat Gan, 52900
Israel
HOME PAGE: http://law.biu.ac.il/English/segelE.php#
Gideon Parchomovsky (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania Law School ( email )
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
United States
215-898-1603 (Phone)
Bar Ilan University - Faculty of Law ( email )
Ramat Gan 52900
Israel
972-2-5317078 (Phone)
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