Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=269241
 
 

References (37)



 
 

Citations (111)



 


 



Financial Contracting


Oliver Hart


Harvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

April 2001

Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1924; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 327

Abstract:     
This paper discusses how economists' views of firms' financial structure decisions have evolved from treating firms' profitability as given; to acknowledging that managerial actions affect profitability; to recognizing that firm value depends on the allocation of decision or control rights. The paper argues that the decision or control rights approach is useful, even though it is at an early stage of development, and that the approach has some empirical content: it can throw light on the structure of venture capital contracts and the reasons for the diversity of claims.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 49

Keywords: Financial contracting, decision rights, control rights

JEL Classification: D2, G3, L2

working papers series





Download This Paper

Date posted: May 8, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Hart , Oliver, Financial Contracting (April 2001). Harvard Institute of Economic Research Paper No. 1924; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 327. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=269241 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.269241

Contact Information

Oliver D. Hart (Contact Author)
Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-496-3461 (Phone)
617-495-7730 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 6,142
Downloads: 2,181
Download Rank: 3,013
References:  37
Citations:  111

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo2 in 0.344 seconds