On Strategic Complementarities in Discontinuous Games with Totally Ordered Strategies
18 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2015 Last revised: 22 Mar 2016
Date Written: March 16, 2016
Abstract
This paper studies the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where the strategy sets are totally ordered. By relaxing the conventional conditions related to upper semicontinuity and single crossing, we enlarge the class of games to which monotone techniques are applicable. The results are illustrated with a number of economics-related examples.
Keywords: Discontinuous game; Strategic complementarities; Better-reply security; Directional single crossing; Increasing correspondence
JEL Classification: C65; C72
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation
Prokopovych, Pavlo and Yannelis, Nicholas, On Strategic Complementarities in Discontinuous Games with Totally Ordered Strategies (March 16, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2695387 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2695387
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