On Strategic Complementarities in Discontinuous Games with Totally Ordered Strategies

18 Pages Posted: 27 Nov 2015 Last revised: 22 Mar 2016

See all articles by Pavlo Prokopovych

Pavlo Prokopovych

Kyiv School of Economics

Nicholas Yannelis

University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business

Date Written: March 16, 2016

Abstract

This paper studies the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium in games with strategic complementarities where the strategy sets are totally ordered. By relaxing the conventional conditions related to upper semicontinuity and single crossing, we enlarge the class of games to which monotone techniques are applicable. The results are illustrated with a number of economics-related examples.

Keywords: Discontinuous game; Strategic complementarities; Better-reply security; Directional single crossing; Increasing correspondence

JEL Classification: C65; C72

Suggested Citation

Prokopovych, Pavlo and Yannelis, Nicholas, On Strategic Complementarities in Discontinuous Games with Totally Ordered Strategies (March 16, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2695387 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2695387

Pavlo Prokopovych (Contact Author)

Kyiv School of Economics ( email )

vul. Yakira, 13, 3d floor, suite 334
Kyiv, 04119
Ukraine

Nicholas Yannelis

University of Iowa - Henry B. Tippie College of Business ( email )

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