Other Regarding Preferences and Reciprocity: Insights from Experimental Findings and Satisfaction Data

30 Pages Posted: 3 Feb 2016

See all articles by Leonardo Becchetti

Leonardo Becchetti

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics

Vittorio Pelligra

Universita di Cagliari - Department of Economic and Social Sciences

Serena Taurino

University of Rome Tor Vergata

Date Written: December 2, 2015

Abstract

We measure satisfaction about experimental outcomes, personal and other participants' behaviour after a multiperiod "hybrid contribution" multiplayer prisoner's dilemma called the "vote with the wallet" game. Our work shows that participants who cooperated above median (which we defi ne as strong cooperators) are signi ficantly more satis ed with the game in proportion to their cooperative choice. On the contrary, their satisfaction for the other players' behavior is negatively correlated with the extent of their own cooperative behavior and the non-cooperative behavior of the latter. The satisfaction of strong cooperators for their behavior in the game depends in turn on the share of their own cooperative choices. We document that a broader utility function including heterogeneity in expectations on other players' behavior, other-regarding preferences, and a negative reciprocity argument may account for the combination of the observed experimental and satisfaction fi ndings.

Suggested Citation

Becchetti, Leonardo and Pelligra, Vittorio and Taurino, Serena, Other Regarding Preferences and Reciprocity: Insights from Experimental Findings and Satisfaction Data (December 2, 2015). CEIS Working Paper No. 363, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2698132 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2698132

Leonardo Becchetti (Contact Author)

University of Rome Tor Vergata - Faculty of Economics ( email )

Via Columbia, 2
I-00133 Rome
Italy

Vittorio Pelligra

Universita di Cagliari - Department of Economic and Social Sciences ( email )

V. S. Ignazio 17
Cagliari 09123, CA 09123
Italy

Serena Taurino

University of Rome Tor Vergata ( email )

Via Orazio Raimondo, 18,
Roma, 00173
Italy

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