An Experiment on Social Mislearning

46 Pages Posted: 18 Dec 2015 Last revised: 30 Dec 2015

See all articles by Erik Eyster

Erik Eyster

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics

Matthew Rabin

Harvard University - Department of Economics

Georg Weizsacker

Humboldt University Berlin; DIW Berlin

Date Written: December 18, 2015

Abstract

We investigate experimentally whether social learners appreciate the redundancy of information conveyed by the behavior of those they observe. Each experimental participant observes a private signal and enters an estimate of the sum of all earlier-moving participants’ signals plus her own. In a first treatment, participants move single-file and observe all predecessors’ entries; Bayesian Nash Equilibrium (BNE) predicts that each participant simply add her signal to her immediate predecessor’s entry. Although 75% of participants do so, a tendency towards redundancy neglect by the other 25% generates excess imitation and mild inefficiencies overall. In a second treatment, participants move four at a time; BNE predicts that most players anti-imitate some observed entries. Such anti-imitation occurs 35% of the time when most transparent, and 16% overall. The remaining redundancy neglect creates dramatic excess imitation and inefficiencies overall: late-period entries are far too extreme, and on average participants would earn substantially more by ignoring their predecessors altogether.

Keywords: social learning, experiments, redundancy neglect, beliefs

JEL Classification: B49

Suggested Citation

Eyster, Erik and Rabin, Matthew and Weizsacker, Georg, An Experiment on Social Mislearning (December 18, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2704746 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2704746

Erik Eyster

London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Department of Economics ( email )

Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom

Matthew Rabin

Harvard University - Department of Economics ( email )

Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States

Georg Weizsacker (Contact Author)

Humboldt University Berlin ( email )

Spandauer Str. 1
Berlin, D-10099
Germany

DIW Berlin

Mohrenstr. 58
Berlin
Germany

Do you have negative results from your research you’d like to share?

Paper statistics

Downloads
444
Abstract Views
2,692
Rank
120,085
PlumX Metrics