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The European UMTS/IMT-2000 Licence Auctions
Philippe Jehiel University College London - Department of Economics; Ecole Nationale des Ponts et Chaussées (ENPC) - Centre d'Enseignement et de Recherche en Analyse Socio-Economique (CERAS); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Benny Moldovanu University of Bonn - Chair of Economic Theory II; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) May 2001 CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2810 Abstract: Europe has taken the global lead in the issuance of third generation (3G) licences for mobile telecommunications according to the UMTS/IMT-2000 family of standards. We survey the recent European UMTS licence auctions and compare their outcomes with the predictions of a simple auction model that emphasises future market structure as a main determinant of valuations for licenses. Since the main goal of most spectrum allocation procedures is economic efficiency, and since consumers (who are affected by the ensuing market structure) do not participate at the auction stage, good designs must alleviate the asymmetry among incumbents and potential entrants by actively encouraging entry.
Keywords: Licence auctions, market entry, UMTS JEL Classifications: D44, D45, L13, L96 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: May 24, 2001 ; Last revised: May 24, 2001Suggested CitationContact Information
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