Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252
 


 



Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition


José Azar


Charles River Associates (CRA)

Sahil Raina


University of Michigan, Ross School of Business

Martin C. Schmalz


University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business

January 8, 2016


Abstract:     
We document a secular increase of deposit account maintenance fees and fee thresholds with a new branch-level dataset, as well as substantial cross-sectional variation in these prices and in deposit rate spreads. We then examine whether variation in bank concentration helps explain the variation in prices. The standard measure of concentration, the HHI, is not correlated with any of the outcome variables. A generalized HHI (GHHI) that captures both common ownership (the degree to which banks are commonly owned by the same investors) and cross-ownership (the extent to which banks own shares in each other) is strongly correlated with higher maintenance fees, fee thresholds, and deposit rate spreads. We use the growth of index funds as a source of variation to suggest a causal link from GHHI to higher prices for banking products.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 72

Keywords: Competition, Ownership, Diversification, Pricing, Antitrust, Governance, Product Market, Bank Competition

JEL Classification: L41, L10, G34


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Date posted: January 3, 2016 ; Last revised: March 2, 2016

Suggested Citation

Azar, José and Raina, Sahil and Schmalz, Martin C., Ultimate Ownership and Bank Competition (January 8, 2016). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2710252 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2710252

Contact Information

José Azar (Contact Author)
Charles River Associates (CRA) ( email )
1201 F. St. NW
Ste. 700
Washington, DC 20004
United States
Sahil Raina
University of Michigan, Ross School of Business ( email )
701 Tappan Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States
Martin C. Schmalz
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )
701 Tappan St
R5456
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States
7347630304 (Phone)
HOME PAGE: http://https://sites.google.com/site/martincschmalz/
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