Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=272593
 
 

References (38)



 
 

Citations (10)



 


 



Too Cool for School? Signaling and Countersignaling


Nick Feltovich


University of Houston - Department of Economics

Rick Harbaugh


Indiana University - Business Economics and Public Policy; Indiana University - Department of Economics

Ted To


Bureau of Labor Statistics

March 2001


Abstract:     
In signaling environments ranging from consumption to education, high quality senders often shun the standard signals that should separate them from lower quality senders. We find that allowing for additional, noisy information on sender quality permits equilibria where medium types signal to separate themselves from low types, but high types then choose to not signal or "countersignal". High types not only save costs by relying on the additional information to stochastically separate them from low types, but countersignaling itself is a signal of confidence which separates high types from medium types. Experimental results confirm that subjects can learn to countersignal.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 34

Keywords: signaling, countersignaling, confidence, understatement

JEL Classification: C72, D82, D83

working papers series


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Date posted: June 8, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Feltovich, Nick and Harbaugh, Rick and To, Ted, Too Cool for School? Signaling and Countersignaling (March 2001). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=272593 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.272593

Contact Information

Nicholas J. Feltovich
University of Houston - Department of Economics ( email )
Houston, TX 77204-5882
United States
Rick Harbaugh (Contact Author)
Indiana University - Business Economics and Public Policy ( email )
1309 East Tenth Street
Bloomington, IN 47405-1701
United States
812-855-2777 (Phone)
812-855-3354 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.bus.indiana.edu/riharbau/
Indiana University - Department of Economics ( email )
Bloomington, IN 47405-6620
United States
Ted To
Bureau of Labor Statistics ( email )
2 Massachusetts Avenue, NE
Room 3105
Washington, DC 20212
United States
202-691-6590 (Phone)
202-691-6583 (Fax)
Feedback to SSRN


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