Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory
41 Pages Posted: 2 Feb 2016
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Unanimous Rules in the Laboratory
Date Written: January 2016
Abstract
We study the information aggregation properties of unanimous voting rules in the laboratory. In line with theoretical predictions, we find that majority rule with veto power dominates unanimity rule. We also find that the strategic voting model is a fairly good predictor of observed subject behavior. There are, however, cases where organizing the data seems to require a mix of strategic and sincere voting. This pattern of behavior would imply that the way majority rule with veto power is framed may significantly affect the outcome of the vote. Our data strongly supports such an hypothesis.
Keywords: constructive abstention, framing, information aggregation, laboratory experiments, unanimity rule, veto power
JEL Classification: C92, D70
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation