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http://ssrn.com/abstract=273465
 
 

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Board Overlap, Seat Accumulation, and Share Prices


Urs Peyer


INSEAD - Finance

Claudio F. Loderer


University of Berne - Institute for Financial Management; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Swiss Finance Institute

September 5, 2001

EFMA 2001 Lugano Meetings

Abstract:     
We examine the board overlap among firms listed in Switzerland. Collusion, managerial entrenchment, and financial participation cannot explain it. The overlap appears to be induced by banks and by the accumulation of seats by the most popular directors. We also document that seat accumulation is negatively related to firm value, possibly because of the conflicts of interest that multiple directorships induce and the time constraints that directors face. Contrary to popular beliefs, however, the directors of traded firms do not generally hold more than one mandate in other traded firms. They do, however, hold multiple seats in nontraded firms.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 40

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Date posted: June 14, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Peyer, Urs and Loderer, Claudio F., Board Overlap, Seat Accumulation, and Share Prices (September 5, 2001). EFMA 2001 Lugano Meetings. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=273465 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.273465

Contact Information

Urs C. Peyer
INSEAD - Finance ( email )
Boulevard de Constance
F-77305 Fontainebleau Cedex
France
+33 1 6072 4178 (Phone)
+33 1 6072 4045 (Fax)
Claudio F. Loderer (Contact Author)
University of Berne - Institute for Financial Management ( email )
Engehaldenstrasse 4
Bern, CH-3012
Switzerland
+41 31 631 37 75 (Phone)
+41 31 631 84 21 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Swiss Finance Institute ( email )
c/o University of Geneve
40, Bd du Pont-d'Arve
1211 Geneva, CH-6900
Switzerland
HOME PAGE: http://www.sfi.ch

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