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Public Policy for Venture Capital
Christian Keuschnigg University of St. Gallen - Department of Economics (IFF-HSG); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) Soren Bo Nielsen Copenhagen Business School - Department of Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research) May 2001 CESifo Working Paper Series No. 486 Abstract: This paper proposes a simple partial equilibrium model to investigate the effects of government policy on venture capital backed investments. Giving up an alternative career, entrepreneurs focus their effort on a single, high risk venture each. Venture capitalists acquire an equity stake and offer a base salary as well. In addition to providing incentive compatible equity finance, they support the venture with managerial advice to raise survival chances. We analyze several policy measures addressed at venture capital activity: government spending on entrepreneurial training, subsidies to equipment investment, and output subsidies at the production stage. While these measures stimulate entrepreneurship, only cost-effective government services can improve welfare.
Keywords: Venture Capital, Moral Hazard, Managerial Advice, Public Policy JEL Classifications: D82, G24, H24, H25 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: July 21, 2001 ; Last revised: September 01, 2004Suggested CitationContact Information
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