Managerial Monitoring and Discrimination with Intertemporal Optimization
Paulo R. A. Loureiro
University of Brasília- UnB
Catholic University of Brasilia Working Paper
In this paper we develop a model that incorporates the managers' ability and the observed productivity of a worker in a firm's profit function. In that way, the loss of efficiency yielded by the presence of discrimination is compensated for. The model demonstrates that a number of workers with different productivities earns the same wages, which also indicates a form of discrimination.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 11
Keywords: Discrimination, managers, monitoring, productivity and wages
JEL Classification: J71, D82working papers series
Date posted: July 3, 2001
© 2013 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.
This page was processed by apollo3 in 0.359 seconds