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Managerial Monitoring and Discrimination with Intertemporal OptimizationPaulo R. A. LoureiroUniversity of BrasÃlia- UnB May 2001 Catholic University of Brasilia Working Paper Abstract: In this paper we develop a model that incorporates the managers' ability and the observed productivity of a worker in a firm's profit function. In that way, the loss of efficiency yielded by the presence of discrimination is compensated for. The model demonstrates that a number of workers with different productivities earns the same wages, which also indicates a form of discrimination.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 11 Keywords: Discrimination, managers, monitoring, productivity and wages JEL Classification: J71, D82 working papers seriesDate posted: July 3, 2001Suggested CitationContact Information
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