Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=274934
 
 

Citations (30)



 


 



Favoritism Under Social Pressure


Luis Garicano


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business - Economics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Ignacio Palacios-Huerta


London School of Economics

Canice Prendergast


University of Chicago - Booth School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

June 2001

University of Chicago, GSB Working Paper

Abstract:     
This paper provides empirical evidence of favoritism by agents, where that favoritism is generated by social pressure. To do so, we explore the behavior of professional soccer referees. Referees have discretion over the addition of extra time at the end of a soccer game (called injury time), to compensate for lost time due to unusual stoppages. We test for systematic bias shown by Spanish referees in favor of home teams. We show that referees systematically favor home teams by shortening close games where the home team is ahead, and lengthening close games where the home team is behind. They show no such bias for games that are not close. We further show that when the rewards for winning games increase, referees change their bias accordingly. We also identify that the mechanism through which bias operates is the referees' desire to satisfy the crowd, by documenting how the size and composition of the crowd affect referee favoritism.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 37

Keywords: Incentives, Bias, Tournaments, Social Interactions, Sports

JEL Classification: D8, J4, L2

working papers series


Download This Paper

Date posted: July 22, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Garicano, Luis and Palacios-Huerta, Ignacio and Prendergast, Canice, Favoritism Under Social Pressure (June 2001). University of Chicago, GSB Working Paper. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=274934 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.274934

Contact Information

Luis Garicano (Contact Author)
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business - Economics ( email )
Graduate School of Business
1101 East 58th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-834-2862 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Ignacio Palacios-Huerta
London School of Economics ( email )
Dept. of Management
Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
Canice Prendergast
University of Chicago - Booth School of Business ( email )
5807 S. Woodlawn Avenue
Chicago, IL 60637
United States
773-702-7309 (Phone)
773-702-0458 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Feedback to SSRN


Paper statistics
Abstract Views: 1,548
Downloads: 185
Download Rank: 78,324
Citations:  30

© 2014 Social Science Electronic Publishing, Inc. All Rights Reserved.  FAQ   Terms of Use   Privacy Policy   Copyright   Contact Us
This page was processed by apollo7 in 0.297 seconds