Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=275336
 
 

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War and Democracy


Gregory D. Hess


Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)

Athanasios Orphanides


Central Bank of Cyprus


Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 109, August 2001

Abstract:     
We present a general equilibrium model of conflict to investigate whether the prevalence of democracy is sufficient to foster the perpetual peace hypothesized by Immanuel Kant and whether the world would necessarily become more peaceful as more countries adopt democratic institutions. Our exploration suggests that neither hypothesis is true. The desire of incumbent leaders with unfavorable economic performance to hold on to power generates an incentive to initiate conflict and salvage their position-- with some probability. An equilibrium with positive war frequency is sustained even if all nations were to adopt representative democratic institutions and even in the absence of an appropriative motive for war.

Accepted Paper Series


Not Available For Download

Date posted: February 16, 2002  

Suggested Citation

Hess, Gregory D. and Orphanides, Athanasios, War and Democracy. Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 109, August 2001. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=275336

Contact Information

Gregory D. Hess (Contact Author)
Claremont McKenna College - Robert Day School of Economics and Finance ( email )
500 E. Ninth St.
Bauer Center
Claremont, CA 91711-6420
United States
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
HOME PAGE: http://www.CESifo.de
Athanasios Orphanides
Central Bank of Cyprus ( email )
80 Kennedy Ave
1076 Nicosia
Cyprus
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