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The Shareholder-Based Origins of the Corporate Income Tax


Steven A. Bank


University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law

2001

Stanford/Yale Jr. Faculty Forum Paper No. 01-02

Abstract:     
This Article explores the origins of the separate corporate income tax. During the Civil War and Reconstruction, shareholders were taxed on their corporation's undivided profits. While corporations in certain industries were subject to a tax on dividends and undistributed profits, the tax was based on the nature of their business rather than their form of organization. When the income tax returned in 1894, however, corporations were subject to a separate tax. What accounted for this change?

The traditional explanation is that changes in the theory of the corporation led Congress to consider it a separate actor for tax purposes. The evidence for this explanation, however, is unconvincing. This Article concludes that the corporate income tax was seen not as a tax on the entity, but rather as a proxy for a shareholder tax on corporate income. It was a natural outgrowth of state and federal efforts to combat tax evasion and reach intangible wealth. In effect, the corporate income tax was thought to be a necessary mechanism for enforcing an individual income tax. This rationale both undercuts the entity theory explanation for double taxation and provides a basis for distinguishing among various proposals to integrate the corporate and shareholder taxes.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 96

JEL Classification: H25, H24

working papers series


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Date posted: June 28, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Bank, Steven A., The Shareholder-Based Origins of the Corporate Income Tax (2001). Stanford/Yale Jr. Faculty Forum Paper No. 01-02. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=275444 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.275444

Contact Information

Steven A. Bank (Contact Author)
University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA) - School of Law ( email )
385 Charles E. Young Dr. East
Room 1242
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1476
United States
310-794-7601 (Phone)
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