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Global Trends in IPO Methods: Book Building vs. Auctions with Endogenous Entry


Ann E. Sherman


DePaul University

December 2004

AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings

Abstract:     
The U.S. book building method has become increasingly popular for initial public offerings (IPOs) worldwide over the last decade, whereas sealed bid IPO auctions have been abandoned in nearly all of the many countries in which they have been tried. I model book building, discriminatory auctions and uniform price auctions in an environment where the number of investors and the accuracy of investors' information is endogenous. Book building lets underwriters manage investor access to shares, allowing them to: 1) reduce risk for both issuers and investors; and 2) control spending on information acquisition, thereby limiting either underpricing or aftermarket volatility. Since more control and less risk are beneficial to all issuers, the advantages of book building's allocational flexibility may explain why global patterns of issuer choice are surprisingly consistent. My models also predict that offerings with higher expected underpricing will have lower expected aftermarket volatility; that an auction open to large numbers of potential bidders is vulnerable to inaccurate pricing and fluctuations in the number of bidders; and that both book built and auctioned IPOs will exhibit partial adjustment to public information.

Note: Previously Entitled : Global Trends in IPO Methods: Book Building vs. Auctions

Number of Pages in PDF File: 50

Keywords: Initial Public Offering, Equity Offering, IPO, Book Building, Uniform Price Auction, Discriminatory Auction, Endogenous Entry

JEL Classification: G24, G28, G32

working papers series


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Date posted: July 14, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Sherman, Ann E., Global Trends in IPO Methods: Book Building vs. Auctions with Endogenous Entry (December 2004). AFA 2003 Washington, DC Meetings. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=276124 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.276124

Contact Information

Ann E. Sherman (Contact Author)
DePaul University ( email )
1 East Jackson Blvd.
Chicago, IL 60604-2287
United States
312-362-5499 (Phone)
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