On Tax Evasion, Entrepreneurial Generosity and Fungible Assets

22 Pages Posted: 12 Apr 2016

See all articles by Benjamin Bittschi

Benjamin Bittschi

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Sarah Borgloh

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research

Marc-Daniel Moessinger

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW)

Date Written: March 2016

Abstract

We estimate the effects of income from various sources on charitable giving using administrative German income tax data. We demonstrate that charitable contributions are not uniformly affected by different income types. While business and capital income exhibit a positive effect, the remaining income sources do not influence charity on statistically significant levels. This exercise is not new and has been conducted for (at least) three different purposes:

1) Relying on the described results, a public finance researcher would state that business and capital income are more prone to tax evasion than the remaining income sources.

2) An entrepreneurship researcher would conclude that business owners are more generous than employees, and

3) a researcher testing the validity of the life cycle theory (or its behavioral counterpart) would refute the fungibility of income.

In contrast, we argue that none of these approaches can answer the intended question if solicitation effects of fundraising or measurement error of the income sources are not taken into account. Applying a fixed effect poisson model, we demonstrate that under certain assumptions the results can have a meaningful interpretation.

Keywords: tax evasion, entrepreneurial behavior, charitable giving, income fungibility, administrative data, fixed-effects poisson model

JEL Classification: D91, E21, H26, H41, L26

Suggested Citation

Bittschi, Benjamin and Borgloh, Sarah and Moessinger, Marc-Daniel, On Tax Evasion, Entrepreneurial Generosity and Fungible Assets (March 2016). ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper No. 16-024, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2762301 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2762301

Benjamin Bittschi (Contact Author)

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Sarah Borgloh

ZEW – Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ( email )

P.O. Box 10 34 43
L 7,1
D-68034 Mannheim, 68034
Germany

Marc-Daniel Moessinger

Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW) ( email )

L7,1
Mannheim, DE 68161
Germany
+49 621 1235 161 (Phone)
+49 621 1235 223 (Fax)

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