Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry
17 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2016
Date Written: April 21, 2016
Abstract
We derive a necessary and a sufficient condition for Nash implementation with a procedurally fair mechanism. Our result has a nice analogue with the path-braking result of Maskin [Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 23-38.], and therefore, it allows us to give a simple characterization of those choice rules that are implementable, but not in a procedurally fair way. This reveals the constraints that insisting on procedural fairness impose on the collective.
Keywords: Characterization, Implementation, Nash equilibrium, Other regarding preferences, Procedural fairness
JEL Classification: C72, D64, D70, D71
Suggested Citation: Suggested Citation