Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry

17 Pages Posted: 25 Apr 2016

See all articles by Ville Korpela

Ville Korpela

Turku School of Economics (TSE)

Date Written: April 21, 2016

Abstract

We derive a necessary and a sufficient condition for Nash implementation with a procedurally fair mechanism. Our result has a nice analogue with the path-braking result of Maskin [Nash equilibrium and welfare optimality, Rev. Econ. Stud. 66 (1999) 23-38.], and therefore, it allows us to give a simple characterization of those choice rules that are implementable, but not in a procedurally fair way. This reveals the constraints that insisting on procedural fairness impose on the collective.

Keywords: Characterization, Implementation, Nash equilibrium, Other regarding preferences, Procedural fairness

JEL Classification: C72, D64, D70, D71

Suggested Citation

Korpela, Ville, Procedurally Fair Implementation: The Cost of Insisting on Symmetry (April 21, 2016). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2768592 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2768592

Ville Korpela (Contact Author)

Turku School of Economics (TSE) ( email )

FI-20014 Turun Yliopisto
Finland

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