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Low Price Equilibrium in Multi-Unit Auctions: The GSM Spectrum Auction in Germany
Veronika Grimm Universidad de Alicante - Department of Economic Analysis Frank Riedel University of Bielefeld - Institute of Mathematical Economics (IMW) Elmar Wolfstetter Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); World Bank; Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce June 2001 CESifo Working Paper Series No. 506 Abstract: The second-generation GSM spectrum auction in Germany is probably the most clear cut example of a low price outcome in a simultaneous ascending-bid auction. The present paper gives an account of the events, describes the auction rules and market conditions, and provides a theoretical explanation of low price equilibria in simultaneous, ascending-bid auctions. In particular it is shown that the low price equilibrium that implements the efficient allocation is the unique perfect equilibrium of that game.
Keywords: Multi-Unit Auctions, Spectrum Auctions, Telecommunications, Industrial Organization, Game Theory JEL Classifications: D44, D45 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: August 01, 2001 ; Last revised: September 01, 2004Suggested CitationContact Information
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