Corruption and Bicameral Reforms

32 Pages Posted: 16 May 2016

See all articles by Giovanni Facchini

Giovanni Facchini

University of Nottingham

Cecilia Testa

University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics

Date Written: May 2016

Abstract

During the last decade unicameral proposals have been put forward in fourteen US states. In this paper we analyze the effects of the proposed constitutional reforms, in a setting where decision making is subject to 'hard time constraints', and lawmakers face the opposing interests of a lobby and the electorate. We show that bicameralism might lead to a decline in the lawmakers' bargaining power vis-a-vis the lobby, thus compromising their accountability to voters. Hence, bicameralism is not a panacea against the abuse of power by elected legislators and the proposed unicameral reforms could be effective in reducing corruption among elected representatives.

Keywords: Bicameralism, Corruption, Lobbying

JEL Classification: D72, D73

Suggested Citation

Facchini, Giovanni and Testa, Cecilia, Corruption and Bicameral Reforms (May 2016). CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP11281, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2780389

Giovanni Facchini (Contact Author)

University of Nottingham ( email )

University Park
Nottingham, NG8 1BB
United Kingdom

Cecilia Testa

University of London, Royal Holloway College - Department of Economics ( email )

Royal Holloway College
Egham
Surrey, Surrey TW20 0EX
United Kingdom

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