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Negotiating Climate Change as a Social Situation
Lise Wietze VU University Amsterdam - Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM) Richard S. J. Tol VU University Amsterdam - Institute for Environmental Studies (IVM); Carnegie Mellon University - Center for Integrated Study of the Human Dimensions of Global Change; University of Hamburg - Centre for Marine and Climate Research (ZMK); Princeton University Bob Van der Zwaan Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands (ECN) - Policy Studies Department; Harvard University - John F. Kennedy School of Government June 2001 FEEM Working Paper No. 44.2001 Abstract: This paper applies the theory of social situations to international environmental agreements on greenhouse gas emission reduction. The usual pessimism on the size of stable coalitions among world regions is challenged for two alternative cases, namely by introducing farsightedness and by introducing coalitional moves with commitment. This is an extension of stability in the cartel game, where a cartel symbolises a coalition among world regions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. It is a special case of the commitment situation, which has been proposed in the theory of social situations. The results are obtained by restricting the move rules in the game among world regions.
Keywords: Coalitions, coalitional moves, cooperation, theory of social situations, international negotiations, climate change JEL Classifications: C7, F42, Q2 Working Paper SeriesDate posted: August 04, 2001 ; Last revised: September 10, 2001Suggested CitationContact Information
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