Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=278728
 
 

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The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation


Roberta Romano


Yale Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

July 2001

Yale ICF Working Paper No. 00-49; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 258

Abstract:     
This paper advocates opening up international securities regulation to greater regulatory competition than the scant competition that exists at present. After sketching the contours of an international regime of regulatory competition in securities laws and the reasons why such competition is desirable, the paper provides a detailed response to objections that have been raised to a proposal for a competitive securities regime that was principally focused on the United States, objections that would accordingly also be raised against this paper's proposal. These include whether the U.S. securities regime is directed at mitigating problems regarding disclosure of interfirm externalities and whether international competition will result in a regulatory race to the lowest level of disclosure. Because the analysis in support of regulatory competition in securities law draws upon the learning regarding competition across U.S. states over the production of corporate law, which has been successful in creating a regime that, on balance, benefits shareholders, the paper concludes by showing that recent critiques of the efficacy of state charter competition are unfounded.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 143

JEL Classification: K22, G18

working papers series


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Date posted: August 6, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Romano, Roberta, The Need for Competition in International Securities Regulation (July 2001). Yale ICF Working Paper No. 00-49; Yale Law & Economics Research Paper No. 258. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=278728 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.278728

Contact Information

Roberta Romano (Contact Author)
Yale Law School ( email )
P.O. Box 208215
New Haven, CT 06520-8215
United States
203-432-4965 (Phone)
203-432-4871 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
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