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When Does Capital Account Liberalization Help More Than It Hurts?


Carlos Oscar Arteta


Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve - Division of International Finance (IFDP)

Barry Eichengreen


University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

Charles Wyplosz


University of Geneva - Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)

August 2001

CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2910

Abstract:     
In this Paper we reconsider the evidence on capital account liberalization and growth. While we find indications of a positive association, the effects vary with time, with how capital account liberalization is measured, and with how the relationship is estimated. The evidence that the effects of capital account liberalization are stronger in high-income countries is similarly fragile. There is some evidence that the positive growth effects of liberalization are stronger in countries with strong institutions, as measured by standard indicators of the rule of law, but only weak evidence that the benefits grow with a country's financial depth and development. We find more evidence of a correlation between capital account liberalization and growth when we allow the effect to vary with other dimensions of openness. There are two interpretations of this finding, one in terms of the sequencing of trade and financial liberalization, the other in terms of the need to eliminate major macroeconomic imbalances before opening the capital account. By and large our results support the second interpretation.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 45

Keywords: Capital

JEL Classification: F10, F20

working papers series


Date posted: August 16, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Arteta, Carlos Oscar, Eichengreen, Barry and Wyplosz, Charles, When Does Capital Account Liberalization Help More Than It Hurts? (August 2001). CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2910. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=280257

Contact Information

Carlos Oscar Arteta (Contact Author)
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve - Division of International Finance (IFDP) ( email )
20th St. and Constitution Ave.
Mail Stop 24
Washington, DC 20551
United States
202-452-2762 (Phone)
202-736-5638 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.federalreserve.gov/research/staff/artetacarloso.htm
Barry Eichengreen
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Economics ( email )
549 Evans Hall #3880
Berkeley, CA 94720-3880
United States
510-642-2772 (Phone)
510-642-0822 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Charles Wyplosz
University of Geneva - Graduate Institute of International Studies (HEI) ( email )
PO Box 136
Geneva, CH-1211
Switzerland
+41 22 908 5946 (Phone)
+41 22 733 3049 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://heiwww.unige.ch/~wyplosz
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR)
77 Bastwick Street
London, EC1V 3PZ
United Kingdom
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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References:  25
Citations:  57

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