Information Sharing in Banking: A Collusive Device?
University of Vienna - Faculty of Business, Economics, and Statistics; Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI); Vienna Graduate School of Finance (VGSF)
Swedish School of Economics and Business Administration
CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2911
We show that information sharing among banks may serve as a collusive device. An informational sharing agreement is an a-priori commitment to reduce informational asymmetries between banks in future lending. Hence, information sharing tends to increase the intensity of competition in future periods and, thus, reduces the value of informational rents in current competition. We contribute to the existing literature by emphasising that a reduction in informational rents will also reduce the intensity of competition in the current period, thereby reducing competitive pressure in current credit markets. We provide a large class of economic environments, where a ban on information sharing would be strictly welfare enhancing.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 28
Keywords: Information sharing, collusion, imperfectly competitive credit markets
JEL Classification: D82, G21, L15working papers series
Date posted: August 16, 2001
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