Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions: An Experimental Study
Max Planck Institute of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research)
Technical University of Berlin
Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute for Economic Research); Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce; World Bank
SFB 373 Humboldt University Discussion Paper No. 2001/15
We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders' preference for first- vs. second-price auctions.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 30
Keywords: Sealed Bid Auctions, Asymmetric Bidders, Private-Independent Values, Experiments
JEL Classification: D44, C91working papers series
Date posted: August 20, 2001
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