Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=280599
 
 

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Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions: An Experimental Study


Werner Guth


Max Planck Institute of Economics; CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)

Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel


Technische Universität Berlin (TU Berlin)

Elmar Wolfstetter


Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics; Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce


SFB 373 Humboldt University Discussion Paper No. 2001/15

Abstract:     
We review an asymmetric auction experiment. Based on Plum (1992) private valuations of the two bidders are independently drawn from distinct but commonly known distributions, one of which stochastically dominating the other. We test the qualitative properties of that model of asymmetric auctions, in particular whether the weak bidder behaves more aggressively than the strong and then test bidders' preference for first- vs. second-price auctions.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 30

Keywords: Sealed Bid Auctions, Asymmetric Bidders, Private-Independent Values, Experiments

JEL Classification: D44, C91

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Date posted: August 20, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Guth, Werner and Ivanova-Stenzel, Radosveta and Wolfstetter, Elmar, Bidding Behavior in Asymmetric Auctions: An Experimental Study. SFB 373 Humboldt University Discussion Paper No. 2001/15. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=280599 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.280599

Contact Information

Werner Güth
Max Planck Institute of Economics ( email )
Kahlaische Strasse 10
D-07745 Jena, 07745
Germany
CESifo (Center for Economic Studies and Ifo Institute)
Poschinger Str. 5
Munich, DE-81679
Germany
Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel (Contact Author)
Technical University of Berlin
Straße des 17. Juni 135
Berlin, 10623
Germany
Elmar G. Wolfstetter
Humboldt University of Berlin - Faculty of Economics ( email )
Institut für Wirtschaftstheorie I
Spandauer Strasse 1
Berlin
Germany
+49 30 2093 5652/3 (Phone)
+49 30 2093 5619 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.wiwi.hu-berlin.de/wt1/
Korea University - College of Economics and Commerce ( email )
Anam-dong, Sungbuk-Ku
Seoul, 136-701
Korea
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References:  17
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