Practical Concepts of Law as Artifact Kind

Pravni vjesnik, 3-4 (2015)

11 Pages Posted: 21 Jul 2016 Last revised: 31 Jul 2016

See all articles by Luka Burazin

Luka Burazin

University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law

Date Written: September 28, 2015

Abstract

It is often said that, in contrast to natural kinds, artifacts are mind-dependent, meaning that they somehow depend on either human beliefs or activities. In addition, some specifically claim that this mind-dependency of artifacts means that they are concept-dependent, i.e., that they are constituted by the concepts and intentions of humans (artifact authors or creators) and that the latter, in turn, determine what features are relevant for an artifact to be a member of a certain artifact kind. The paper therefore inquires into what these constitutive concepts are and what role they play. It also tries to explain the relationship between these concepts and the ‘theoretical’ ones. Since the paper’s main thesis is that law as such is an artifact or, more precisely, that legal systems are artifacts, it considers the said issue specifically in relation to the jurisprudential views on the ontological character of law.

Keywords: legal systems, artifact kinds, institutional artifacts, concept-dependency, practical concepts, theoretical concepts

Suggested Citation

Burazin, Luka, Practical Concepts of Law as Artifact Kind (September 28, 2015). Pravni vjesnik, 3-4 (2015), Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2810416

Luka Burazin (Contact Author)

University of Zagreb, Faculty of Law ( email )

Trg Republike Hrvatske 14
Zagreb, 10000
Croatia

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