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Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance: UK Evidence


Martin J. Conyon


University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Richard B. Freeman


National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); University of Edinburgh - School of Social and Political Studies; Harvard University; London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP)

August 2001

NBER Working Paper No. w8448

Abstract:     
This paper examines the use and consequences of shared compensation plans (profit sharing, profit related pay, SAYE schemes and company stock option plans) in a sample of UK workplaces and firms in the 1990s. The use of these plans has increased over time, in part in response to government programs. The evidence shows that companies and workplaces adopting shared compensation practices have had higher productivity than other firms, but the effects vary among programs, suggesting that the particulars matter a lot in aligning shared compensation and work place activities. Consistent with incentive theory, the evidence also shows that firms and workplaces with shared compensation practices have a higher incidence of shared decision-making / information sharing practices.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 51

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Date posted: August 26, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Conyon, Martin J. and Freeman, Richard B., Shared Modes of Compensation and Firm Performance: UK Evidence (August 2001). NBER Working Paper No. w8448. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=281079

Contact Information

Martin J. Conyon (Contact Author)
University of Pennsylvania - The Wharton School ( email )
3600 Locust Walk
Philadelphia, PA 19104-6365
United States
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) ( email )
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
Richard B. Freeman
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-868-3900 (Phone)
617-868-2742 (Fax)
University of Edinburgh - School of Social and Political Studies ( email )
Adam Ferguson Building
George Square
Edinburgh EH8 9LL
United Kingdom
Harvard University ( email )
Littauer Center
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-868-3900 (Phone)
London School of Economics & Political Science (LSE) - Centre for Economic Performance (CEP) ( email )
Houghton Street
London WC2A 2AE
Feedback to SSRN (Beta)


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