Tilting the Table? The Use of Preliminary Injunctions
Jean O. Lanjouw
University of California, Berkeley - Department of Agricultural & Resource Economics; Brookings Institution; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Harvard Business School - Finance Unit; Harvard University - Entrepreneurial Management Unit; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
Journal of Law & Economics, Vol. 44, No. 2, Part 1, October 2001
This paper examines the economic role of preliminary injunctions in legal disputes. We present a model in which differences in financing costs drive the use of preliminary injunction and explore the implications of this legal remedy for ex-post efficiency and ex-ante incentives. Controlling for the nature of the dispute, we examine the relationships between the financial status of litigating parties and whether a preliminary injunction is requested. The empirical analysis uses detailed data compiled for a sample of 252 patent suits and reveals patterns generally consistent with those suggested by the model.
Accepted Paper Series
Date posted: October 3, 2001
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