Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=281434
 
 

References (21)



 
 

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Financial Contracting, Signal-Jamming, and Entry Deterrence


Neelam Jain


City University London

Thomas D. Jeitschko


Michigan State University - Department of Economics

Leonard J. Mirman


University of Virginia - Department of Economics

August 27, 2001


Abstract:     
We study the relationship between financial contracting and entry deterrence when the potential entrant observes the market price but does not observe the financial contract. This leads to the possibility that the entrant and the lender have different beliefs about the incumbent's costs, due to uncertainty in the demand for the good. We show that as a result, the incumbent produces a different level of output in the first period and the probability of entry increases compared to the case when the entrant observes the financial contract.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 46

Keywords: Experimentation, Strategic Experimentation, Signal Dampening, Signal Jamming, Financial Intermediation, Entry Deterrence

JEL Classification: C73, D8, L1

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Date posted: August 29, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Jain, Neelam and Jeitschko, Thomas D. and Mirman, Leonard J., Financial Contracting, Signal-Jamming, and Entry Deterrence (August 27, 2001). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=281434 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.281434

Contact Information

Neelam Jain
City University London ( email )
Northampton Square
London, EC1V OHB
United Kingdom
Thomas D. Jeitschko (Contact Author)
Michigan State University - Department of Economics ( email )
110 Marshall-Adams Hall
East Lansing, MI 48824
United States
517-355-8302 (Phone)
517-432-1068 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.msu.edu/~jeitschk/
Leonard J. Mirman
University of Virginia (UVA) - Department of Economics ( email )
P.O. Box 400182
114 Rouss Hall
Charlottesville, VA 22904-4182
United States
434-924-6756 (Phone)
434-982-2904 (Fax)
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