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Structural Principles and Presidential Succession


Howard M. Wasserman


Florida International University (FIU) - College of Law

August 2001

FSU College of Law, Public Law Working Paper No. 34

Abstract:     
An important, but often overlooked, aspect of the
Constitution is the way in which it established and structured
the federal government, including the methods and procedures
for selecting officeholders. The Constitution establishes some
of these procedures itself and punts others to Congress for the passage of framework legislation. Any decisions as to the
design, creation, and operation of a selection procedure
reflect four underlying structural principles - separation of
powers, federalism, democracy, and political partisanship.
Any selection scheme reflects a choice or emphasis on one or
more of these principles and a change in the principles of
emphasis often will require a change in the selection procedures. Every selection decision can and should be examined against these principles to determine what principle or principles are at work; whether the choice properly reflects the principle or principles that it is trying to reflect; and whether a different procedure would better serve the intended principles.

One selection issue that was punted to Congress and the
legislative process was executive succession in the event of a
double vacancy in the presidency and vice presidency. The
current statute provides for legislative succession, through
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, and is the reason
that Secretary of State Alexander Haig was wrong when,
following the 1981 assassination attempt on President Reagan,
Haig famously declared that he was "in control, here in the
White House."

This Article examines three structural principles - separation of powers, political partisanship, and democracy - and the role each plays in selection under the Constitution. It then analyzes the current double vacancy statute in light of these. It concludes that the present succession order is inconsistent with all three principles, considered individually and on overall balance. A scheme more consistent with each of these principles would establish cabinet succession, beginning with the Secretary of State. The new statute also should provide for a special presidential election as soon as possible.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 74

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Date posted: September 11, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Wasserman, Howard M., Structural Principles and Presidential Succession (August 2001). FSU College of Law, Public Law Working Paper No. 34. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=281670 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.281670

Contact Information

Howard M. Wasserman (Contact Author)
Florida International University (FIU) - College of Law ( email )
University Park, DB 2065
Miami, FL 33199
United States
305-348-7482 (Phone)
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