The Effect of a Switch of Management Company on Pension Plan Fees

Abstract

The impact of a switch of management company on pension plan fees is analysed by comparing the effects on employer-sponsored versus individual defined-contribution private pension plans in Spain. This framework is ideal because the two types differ significantly both in plan governance structure and consequently in the degree of bargaining power held by the decision-maker. In addition, intense bank restructuring, which has greatly modified the Spanish pension plan map, provides an interesting analytical context for the identification of causal links, because it is a scenario that features shocks exogenous to the relationship under analysis. The results show that a switch of management company significantly reduces management fees for employer-sponsored plans when the management change is not due to the bank restructuring process, on the contrary a switch of management company increases fees for individual pension plans.

Keywords: bargaining power; fee setting; pension plan industry; bank restructuring process.

JEL Classification: G23, G30