Political, Merit-Based and Nepotic Elements in the Selection of Hungarian Judges. A Possible Way of Creating Judicial Loyalty in East Central Europe

International Journal of Legal Profession, 2016, Forthcoming

12 Pages Posted: 9 Sep 2016 Last revised: 12 Sep 2016

Date Written: August 26, 2016

Abstract

Hungarian judicial selection has been characterised by meritocratic and nepotic elements since the 1990 regime change which are indirectly distorted by change, albeit to a relatively reduced extent, to political aspects. Scores of Hungarian and foreign experts have evaluated the measures of the justice reform put in place after the 2010 change of government as being about a series of successive measures to politicise the judiciary from the creation of the new constitution to legislation regarding the justice system. In this study it has been demonstrated that regarding the initial phase of judicial selection the gradual strengthening of meritocratic elements may be observed, which continued after 2010 as well. First and foremost, it may be traced in the more objective system of evaluating judicial applications. The possibilities for discretionary decisions by heads of administration have been considerably restricted in the selection of judges. At the same time, however, the competences of heads of administration entitled to make appointments have been broadened upon filling court management positions.

Keywords: selection of judges, Hungary, judicial loyalty, East and Central Europe

JEL Classification: K39, K40, K49

Suggested Citation

Badó, Attila, Political, Merit-Based and Nepotic Elements in the Selection of Hungarian Judges. A Possible Way of Creating Judicial Loyalty in East Central Europe (August 26, 2016). International Journal of Legal Profession, 2016, Forthcoming, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2836384

Attila Badó (Contact Author)

University of Szeged ( email )

P.O. Box 652
Szeged, H-6701
Hungary

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