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The Regulation of EntrySimeon DjankovMinistry of Finance; World Bank Rafael La PortaDartmouth College - Tuck School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) Florencio Lopez de SilanesEDHEC Business School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Tinbergen Institute Andrei ShleiferHarvard University - Department of Economics; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) September 2001 CEPR Discussion Paper No. 2953 Abstract: We present new data on the regulation of entry of start-up firms in 85 countries. The data covers the number of procedures, official time, and official cost that a start-up must bear before it can operate legally. The official costs of entry are extremely high in most countries. Countries with heavier regulation of entry have higher corruption and larger unofficial economies, but not better quality of public or private goods. Countries with more democratic and limited governments have lighter regulation of entry. The evidence is inconsistent with public interest theories of regulation, but supports the public choice view that entry regulation benefits politicians and bureaucrats.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 52 Keywords: Regulation, business entry JEL Classification: H10, K20, L50 working papers seriesDate posted: September 25, 2001Suggested CitationContact Information
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