Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=285252
 
 

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Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice


Lucian A. Bebchuk


Harvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

Allen Ferrell


Harvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)

2001

Virginia Law Review, Vol. 87, pp. 993-1006, 2001
Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 332

Abstract:     
In a recent article, we have put forward a new approach to takeover law and regulatory competition. We proposed a "choice-enhancing" federal intervention that would provide: (i) an optional body of substantive federal takeover law which shareholders would be able to opt into (or out of) and which would be more hospitable than existing state takeover law, and (ii) a mandatory process rule that would provide shareholders the right to initiate and adopt, regardless of managers' wishes, proposals for option into (or out of) the federal takeover law. In this paper, we respond to a critique of our proposal by Professors Stephen Choi and Andrew Guzman, and we further develop the case for choice-enhancing intervention.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 21

JEL Classification: G30, H70, K22

Accepted Paper Series


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Date posted: September 26, 2001 ; Last revised: May 18, 2009

Suggested Citation

Bebchuk, Lucian A. and Ferrell, Allen, Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder Choice (2001). Virginia Law Review, Vol. 87, pp. 993-1006, 2001; Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 332. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=285252 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.285252

Contact Information

Lucian A. Bebchuk (Contact Author)
Harvard Law School ( email )
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
617-495-3138 (Phone)
617-496-3119 (Fax)
HOME PAGE: http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bebchuk/
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) ( email )
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
Centre for Economic Policy Research (CEPR) and European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
Allen Ferrell
Harvard Law School ( email )
Griswold 303 1525 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
(617) 495-8961 (Phone)
(617) 495-1110 (Fax)
European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)
c/o ECARES ULB CP 114
B-1050 Brussels
Belgium
HOME PAGE: http://www.ecgi.org
Feedback to SSRN


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