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Federal Intervention to Enhance Shareholder ChoiceLucian A. BebchukHarvard Law School; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER); European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) Allen FerrellHarvard Law School; European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI) 2001 Virginia Law Review, Vol. 87, pp. 993-1006, 2001 Harvard Law and Economics Discussion Paper No. 332 Abstract: In a recent article, we have put forward a new approach to takeover law and regulatory competition. We proposed a "choice-enhancing" federal intervention that would provide: (i) an optional body of substantive federal takeover law which shareholders would be able to opt into (or out of) and which would be more hospitable than existing state takeover law, and (ii) a mandatory process rule that would provide shareholders the right to initiate and adopt, regardless of managers' wishes, proposals for option into (or out of) the federal takeover law. In this paper, we respond to a critique of our proposal by Professors Stephen Choi and Andrew Guzman, and we further develop the case for choice-enhancing intervention.
Number of Pages in PDF File: 21 JEL Classification: G30, H70, K22 Accepted Paper SeriesDate posted: September 26, 2001 ; Last revised: May 18, 2009Suggested CitationContact Information
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