Abstract

http://ssrn.com/abstract=285345
 
 

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(How) Should Trade Agreements Deal with Income Tax Issues?


Reuven S. Avi-Yonah


University of Michigan Law School

Joel B. Slemrod


University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business; National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)

September 2001

Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper No. 01-008

Abstract:     
This paper addresses the relationship between tax and trade law, as embodied in the network of bilateral tax treaties and the multilateral agreements underlying the WTO. The paper argues that: (1) There is considerable overlap in the goals to be achieved by tax and trade agreements, and full achievement of these goals is not possible without addressing both tax and trade policies. (2) Tax treaties contribute to the avoidance of double taxation but, because of their bilateral nature, cannot effectively address the problem of double non-taxation resulting from tax competition. (3) The WTO agreements as currently drafted address some aspects of the tax competition issue (e.g., preferential tax regimes for trade in goods) but not others (competition for investment and trade in services, including traditional tax havens). (4) Fully achieving the goals of tax and trade agreements may require a multilateral agreement that will address services and investment issues, as well as goods. We remain agnostic whether the WTO or some other forum is the most appropriate one to effectuate such an agreement.

Number of Pages in PDF File: 28

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Date posted: September 28, 2001  

Suggested Citation

Avi-Yonah, Reuven S. and Slemrod, Joel B., (How) Should Trade Agreements Deal with Income Tax Issues? (September 2001). Michigan Law and Economics Research Paper No. 01-008. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=285345 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.285345

Contact Information

Reuven S. Avi-Yonah (Contact Author)
University of Michigan Law School ( email )
625 South State Street
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1215
United States
734-647-4033 (Phone)
Joel B. Slemrod
University of Michigan, Stephen M. Ross School of Business ( email )
701 Tappan Street
Room A2120
Ann Arbor, MI 48109-1234
United States
734-936-3914 (Phone)
734-763-4032 (Fax)
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
United States
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