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Residual Income Claimancy, Monitoring, and the R&D Firm: Theory with Application to Biotechs

John E. Garen
University of Kentucky - Gatton College of Business and Economics

Koyin Chang
Ming-Chuan University


August 2001


Abstract:     
This paper models the assignment of residual income claimancy to an R&D manager and applies the model to biotechnology firms. Residual income claimancy provides incentives for the manager to monitor the R&D process. Because the nature of R&D and of monitoring scientific effort is different, our model predicts stark differences in the residual income claimancy of managers and in other aspects of organization for innovative R&D firms like biotechs. In particular, R&D firms are expected to be more owner-managed, more expert-managed, and smaller in size. Cross-sectional data on biotechnology firms is consistent with these implications. Additionally, longitudinal data indicate that as firms alter their focus on biotech research, their organizational structure changes as expected.

Keywords: monitoring, residual income claimancy, R&D, biotechs, incentives and organizations

JEL Classifications: L20, D20

Working Paper Series

Date posted: October 09, 2001 ; Last revised: November 14, 2001

Suggested Citation

Garen, John E. and Chang, Koyin, Residual Income Claimancy, Monitoring, and the R&D Firm: Theory with Application to Biotechs (August 2001). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=286352 or doi:10.2139/ssrn.286352


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Contact Information

John E. Garen (Contact Author)
University of Kentucky - Gatton College of Business and Economics ( email )
Department of Economics
Lexington, KY 40506
United States
859-257-3581 (Phone)
859-323-1920 (Fax)
Koyin Chang
Ming-Chuan University ( email )
Department of Economics
TaoYuan Taiwan
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References: 27
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